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Abstract
 
This  paper examines geography’s engagements with phenomenology. Tracing 
phenomenology’s influence, from early humanist reflections on the lifeworld to 
non-representational theories of practice, the paper identifies the emergence of a 
distinct post-phenomenological way of thinking. However, there is  currently no 
clear articulation of what differentiates post-phenomenology from 
phenomenology as a set of theories  or ideas, nor is there a clear set of 
trajectories along which such difference can be pursued further. In response to 
this, the paper outlines three key elements that differentiate phenomenology from 
post-phenomenology and that require further exploration. First is  a rethinking of 
intentionality as an emergent relation with the world, rather than an a priori 
condition of experience. Second is a recognition that objects have an 
autonomous existence outside of the ways they appear to or are used by human 
beings. Third is  a reconsideration of our relations with alterity, taking this as 
central to the constitution of phenomenological experience given our irreducible 
being-with the world. Unpacking these differences the paper offers some 
suggestions as  to how post-phenomenology contributes to the broader discipline 
of human geography.  
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1. Introduction
 
This paper examines geography’s  engagements with phenomenology. 
Phenomenology is a school of thought that “give[s] a direct description of our 
experience as it is, without taking account of its psychological origin and the 
causal explanations which the scientist, the historian or the sociologist may be 
able to provide” (Merleau-Ponty 2002: vii). Geographers have for some time 
been interested in phenomenology. Most evidently, this  can be seen in the 
humanistic geographies of the 1970s and 1980s (Buttimer 1976; Buttimer and 
Seamon 1980; Ley and Samuels 1978a, b). Here, phenomenology, alongside a 
range of other ‘humanistic’ approaches, offered an alternative to positivist 
scientific rationality by developing the “ideas and languages to describe and 
explain the human experience of nature, space and time” (Buttimer 1976: 278).
 
Such engagement with phenomenology were subject to a range of critiques 
around their argued inability to comment on the manipulation of people by 
objective social forces (Smith 1979), ethnocentrism (Bonnet 1999), and aesthetic 
masculinity (Rose 1993). However, recently there has been something of a re-
turn to phenomenology within geography in light of interests  in practice 
(Simonsen 2004; Thrift 1996), but also specifically under the development of 
what Rose and Wylie (2006) have called a ‘post-phenomenology’. The term post-
phenomenology first came to prominence through the work of the philosopher of 
science and technology, Don Ihde (2003). For Idhe (2003) post-phenomenology 
is  an attempt to escape the subject-centered nature of classical 
phenomenological thought, and, specifically, the transcendental subject or ego 
found in Husserl. However, geographers have engaged with the term more 
broadly. As Lea (2009: 373) argues, in the first attempt to anatomise post-
phenomenogy in geography, this work has re-read phenomenological texts and 
ideas, often through the lens of post-structural writers such as Gilles Deleuze, 
Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas, and, in so doing, has aimed to “extend 
the boundaries of the phenomenological focus upon the experiencing subject”. 
Drawing together a range of perspectives, Lea (2009: 374) suggests  that post-
phenomenology seeks to: 
“expand the realm of what the (experiential) human is, expand the realm 
of what counts as the empirical field (and how we go about evidencing 
this), and also what geography is (beginning to rely upon the knowledges 
amassed in, for example, cognitive science or  biomedical disciplines)”.
With this in mind, post-phenomenological work is not straight forwardly post-
structural in emphasis, argumentation, or scope. Instead it places a greater 
emphasis on objects/materiality as opposed to textuality (James 2012). In turn, 
inspiration has also been found in a range of more recent post-phenomenological 
authors, such as  Michel Henry, Jean-Luc Nancy, Jean-Luc Marion, Bernard 
Stiegler, and various object-oriented ontologists, who themselves have 
articulated critical and re-invigorated accounts of phenomenology after post-
structuralism.
 
Based on this, we can identify three interrelated features of this critical relation to 
phenomenology. First, there has  been a move away from the assumption of a 
subject that exists prior to experience towards an examination of how the subject 
comes to be in or through experience. Second, this has led to a recognition that 
objects have an autonomous existence outside of the ways they appear to or are 
used by human beings (Harman 2002, Meillassoux 2008). Finally, there has been 
a reconsideration of our relations with alterity in light of these points (Wylie 2009; 
Rose 2010), taking alterity as central to the constitution of phenomenological 
experience given our irreducible being-with the world.
 
In these terms, Lea (2009: 374) argues post-phenomenology “has the potential to 
refigure our understanding of the relation of the body to the world”. However at 
the same time, Lea recognises  that as a distinct area of study, “post-
phenomenological geographies are...not particularly cohesive” (2009: 377). In 
what follows we outline a series of key areas that are central to this re-
engagement with phenomenology through post-phenomenology and suggest 
how these themes can be pursued to continue a expansive engagement with 
phenomenological thought. This is  not to police this  emerging field of enquiry, but 
to suggest potentially fruitful avenues for further exploration.
 
2. Geography and Phenomenology
 
The history of phenomenology is highly complex (Moran 2000). For example, 
Paul Ricoeur argued that “the history of phenomenology is the history of 
Husserlian heresies” (Zahavi 2006: n.p). This can be explained in at least two 
ways. Firstly, Husserl significantly revised his phenomenological project, starting 
from his  early critique of psychologism, moving to his descriptive 
phenomenological investigations of various acts  of consciousness, and arriving 
at his mature transcendental phenomenology (Zahavi 2003). Secondly, a range 
of phenomenologists have taken up Husserl’s ideas from across these periods 
and pushed them in different directions. This variability in what phenomenology 
actually is, in how it is  practiced, and what it ultimately aims towards can also be 
seen in the many ways it has been drawn on by geographers.
 
Humanistic geography was the main starting point for geographic engagements 
with phenomenology (see Buttimer and Seamon 1980; Ley 1979; Ley and 
Samuels 1978a; Relph 1976; Seamon 1979; Tuan 1977). Here it was felt that the 
approach of various phenomenologists would facilitate the description of “man’s 
geographical experiences as they are ‘actually’ experienced – as meaningful, 
value-laden experience prior to the abstractions of science” (Entrikin 1976: 629). 
It is important to note, though, that humanistic geography cannot simply be 
equated with a form of phenomenological geography nor can phenomenology be 
straightforwardly equated with humanism. Phenomenology did form a key 
‘rallying call’ in the development of humanistic geographies (Pickles  1987). 
However, a range of other sources of inspiration were also of importance to its 
development. For example, inspiration was found in Vidal de la Blache’s 
‘Geographie Humaine’ (Buttimer 1978), in the existentialism of Sartre and Buber 
(Samuels  1978), in the social interactionism of Mead (Wilson 1980), and in the 
epistemological framework offered by pragmatism (Smith 1984) (see Ley 1981). 
Furthermore, the various versions of phenomenology drawn on by humanistic 
geographers means that there is also a great deal of diversity here. While for 
some the writings of Husserl and Heidegger on dwelling and the lifeworld formed 
a key point of inspiration (Buttimer 1976), for others the more sociological 
writings of Alfred Schutz on social relations and shared structures of meaning 
allowed for a greater consideration of the context of everyday life (Ley 1979).  
Significant to humanistic geography’s engagement with phenomenology was 
Buttimer’s  (1976) attempt to understand the human experiences of space by 
exploring the concept of ‘lifeworld’. Key here were Husserl’s writings on ‘world’ 
and ‘reduction’, which were also spliced with the more existentialist themes of 
Heidegger’s writings on ‘dwelling’, Merleau-Ponty’s on the body-subject, as well 
as geographic writing on time-space. The ‘lifeworld’ refers  a shared physical and 
social world where “experience is constructed” and where consciousness is 
revealed (Buttimer 1976: 280). Buttimer argued that this lifeworld is  generally 
‘taken-for-granted’ with its  meaning lying largely unquestioned through our day-
to-day routines. Here, phenomenological geography was about questioning such 
routine interactions  with our lifeworld and the alienating influences of science and 
technology so that we can develop a greater self-awareness and be better able 
to empathise with the worlds of others.
 
Similarly interested in this unthought realm of day-to-day action, though focusing 
more specifically on Merleau-Ponty’s writings, is  Seamon’s (1979; 1980) 
influential explorations of spatial experience through the notions of the ‘body-
subject’ and ‘place-ballets’. For Seamon, a phenomenological geography “asks 
the significance of people’s inescapable immersion in a geographical 
world” (1980: 148). A key facet of this  immersion is  the everyday movements we 
engage in in space. Like Buttimer, Seamon emphasized that these movements 
largely fall into the background of our reflective consciousness. Concentrating on 
these unthought aspects of spatial experience allowed Seamon (1980: 157) to 
identify how everyday routine movements operated as ‘body-ballets’: “a set of 
integrated behaviors which sustain a particular task or aim”. Studying these 
body-ballets, Seamon argued that space appeared to people through forms of 
purposeful and sensible embodied action rather than consciously reflected upon 
cognitive intentions. Seamon then argued for a reconception of what constitutes 
the human subject through a focus on body-subjects that respond contextually 
and preconsciously through their sensible actions, rather than mental subjects 
who cognitively interpret space and then proceeded to act in ways that were 
based on these cognitive interpretations.
 
The uptake of phenomenological themes as a part of such humanistic 
geographies did not take place without critique. Notably here, Pickles (1985) 
argued that geographers did not engage with the philosophical method of 
phenomenology in enough detail and so that “Husserl’s entire project [was] 
treated only in caricature form and thus to the empiricist seems to make no 
sense”. While Husserl’s project of excavating the transcendental structures of 
intentional experience undoubtedly presents an immense challenge, a challenge 
that Husserl himself arguably failed to meet, Pickles suggests that the 
philosophical motivation and method of phenomenology was  largely 
misunderstood by humanistic geographers. That said, he does suggest a key 
point from this that was maintained. Namely, that it was impossible to separate 
subject and object into distinct categories. This resulted in the insight (still argued 
today by many phenomenologists) that rather than subjects manipulating objects 
in the external, ‘real’ physical world we are being in, alongside, and toward the 
world.
 
Focusing on this  situatedness of the subject has been key to a range of 
engagements with phenomenology in geography, both within humanistic 
geography and more recently. Situatedness  has, for example, become 
synonymous with work on ‘place’ (see Casey 1993; 1997; Relph 1976; Trigg 
2013). As Larsen and Johnson (2012: 633) suggest:
 
“The insight is that existence is placed: Anything that ‘is’ first requires a 
situation to provide both context and horizon for its availability as an object. 
Place is how the world presents itself; that is to say, being inevitably requires 
a place, a situation, for its disclosure”.
 
For example, in his  foundational work on place Relph (1976: 143) argued that 
contemporary society was seeing a surge in placelessness, that is “the 
undermining of the importance of place for both individuals  and cultures, and the 
casual replacement of the diverse and significant places of the world with 
anonymous spaces and exchangable environments”. Notable also is Malpas’s 
(2006) explication of the ways in which place, or placing, is  central to Heidegger’s 
concerns with existence or being-there. Heidegger’s  ‘topology’ was concerned 
with how our ‘attunement’ through moods and embodiment play a central part in 
the disclosure of the world as we are thrown into it (Larsen and Johnson 2012).
 
Closely related to this, and constituting another key development in geography’s 
engagement with phenomenological work, are interests in ‘dwelling’. For 
Heidegger, dwelling “names the inflection of space, the twisting and crisscrossing 
of interiority and exteriority from which both these horizons gain their 
sense” (Harrison 2007a: 62). Here, subject and world do not pre-exist dwelling 
but rather come from the ‘event’ of dwelling (also see Rose 2012). As suggested 
earlier, this concept did form a key point of interest for humanistic geographers in 
that it allowed for an emphasis  on “an ‘ontological vision’ of ‘togetherness, 
belonging and wholeness’ and so on the discernment of natural ‘underlying 
patterns structures and relationships’” (Seamon 1993: 16 cited in Harrison 
2007a: 626). However, in more recent phenomenological inclined geography this 
‘naturalism’ has been contrasted with the promotion of “a radical 
relationality...and a performative account of existence” (Harrison 2007a: 626). 
Significant to this latter uptake has often been Ingold’s  (2000) re-reading of ‘the 
dwelling perspective’. This relational emphasis can be seen in Wylie’s (2003: 
143) outline of this:
 
“The dwelling perspective…focuses  upon the ‘agent-in-its-environment’...as 
opposed to the self-contained individual confronting a world ‘out there’...in 
focusing upon the ‘agent-in-its-environment’, upon ongoing, relational contexts 
of involvement, the dwelling perspective seeks to deny and dispel the tenants 
of dualistic thought, the separation of...the discursive from the material.”
 
Dwelling according to Ingold becomes a form of situated “practical absorption” or 
“wayfinding” in a ‘taskscape’ (Rose 2012: 759) and Cloke and Jones (2001: 664) 
suggest that such a notion of dwelling “offers an important acknowledgement of 
how human actants are embedded in landscapes...[and]...how nature and culture 
are bound together”. 
More critically, Harrison (2007a) has expanded the conceptual reach from which 
understandings of dwelling are developed by contrasting Heideggerian account 
of dwelling as a proper and self-sufficient mode of being at home in the world (as 
‘enclosure’) with Levinas’s account of dwelling as a constitutive openness to the 
alterity of the other. Here an “irreducible and irresolvable ‘relation’ to alterity” 
comes to inherently disquiet any form of dwelling as centripetal movement or 
assimilation and so positions dwelling only ever as a response to alterity 
(Harrison 2007a: 635). Arguably this provides  a more ethically inclined 
perspective on the dwelling of people in relation to others.
 
Recent interests in practice in geography have also entailed an engagement with 
phenomenological work and this emphasis on our being-in-the-world. For 
example, Simonsen (2005) draws on Merleau-Ponty’s ‘sensuous’ 
phenomenology of lived experience to supplement Lefebvre’s writings on the 
body to understand how the body is creative and generative of social-spatial 
practices (also see Simonsen 2004). Equally, Cresswell (2003) turns to Merleau-
Ponty to rethink landscape beyond its  perceived connotations of fixity, towards an 
understanding based on fluidity and embodied practice. Finally, Merleau-Ponty 
also provided a foundational reference to Thrift’s (1996; 1997) articulations of 
non-representational theory and its  interests in the body in practice. Echoing 
Seamon (1980), Merleau-Ponty’s writings provided Thrift (1996: 13) with a means 
for thinking through how “bodies and things are not easily separated terms” and 
so how the body is both perceiver and perceived, situated in space-time, and so 
the point from which we take hold of the world (also see Wylie 2002; 2005).
 
Humanistic motifs  have also re-emerged in some recent engagements with 
phenomenological ideas, albeit in modified form. For example, there has been a 
desire to retain a measure of ‘minimal humanism’ in work interested in themes 
around affect and practice (see Thrift 2007; Wylie 2010). More extensively, 
Simonsen (2013) has called for a ‘renewed humanism’ in human geography. In 
particular, Simonsen picks up on recent developments around deconstruction 
and post-/anti-humanism and raises  concerns over the ways  in which they 
“demonstrate remaining problems as to the fate of the human in human 
geography, sometimes even verging on a renewal of geography’s old problem of 
naturalism” (2013: 11). Simonsen (2013: 11-12) argues that post-humanist and 
non-representational accounts have “a troubled relationship to issues of lived 
experience, notions  of subjectivity and agency, and (in…[their]…strongest forms) 
also to ones of responsibility and politics” given the way these approaches 
significantly de-centre the subject. In response, Simonson (2013: 12) offers  a 
‘practice-orientated’ re-reading of phenomenology (and of Merleau-Ponty in 
particular) that seeks to provide “a more robust sense of politics, experience and 
agency”. Indeed, Simonsen’s re-reading of Merleau-Ponty offers  key points that 
orientate and inform the following sections  on the body, intersubjectivity, objects, 
and the social. As she puts it, Merleau-Ponty already travels “quite a distance 
down” the anti-/post humanist lane that a number of authors we draw upon are 
sympathetic to and influenced by (Simonsen 2013: 20). However, at the same 
time, Simonson’s ‘new humanism’ differs in some significant regards from the 
post-phenomenology outlined below. In what follows we seek to draw attention to 
the points of productive connection between these nascent areas of concern as 
well as important differences and divergences.
Before explicating this  further though, it is  important to provide some clarification 
on the term ‘post-phenomenology’ and how post-phenomenology has been 
manifest both outside and within geography thus far.
 
3. Towards Post-phenomenology
                                                                                                
In his foundational work on post-phenomenology, Idhe seeks to complicate pre-
existing phenomenological work that begins with an abstract and undifferentated 
body-subject. In doing so, Ihde (2003: 11) “substitutes embodiment for 
subjectivity” and moves towards an existential, rather than transcendental, 
perspective. Ihde  considers the body to be a combination of two bodies; a lived 
body and a socialised body.  As Idhe’s (2003: 13) argues these bodies are not 
opposed to one another but exist together:
                                                      
“first, I deny that body one [the lived] can be absorbed into the cultural, it is  the 
necessary condition for being a body and is describable along the lines of 
corps vecu [lived body]. But, equally, body one is  situated within and 
permeated with body two [the social], the cultural significations which we all 
experience. Embodiment is both actional-perceptual and culturally endowed”.
                                                         
While this  move is made in light of later work in phenomenology, particularly 
Merleau-Ponty, Idhe’s main post-phenomenological move comes in the 
conversation he sets up between phenomenology, pragmatism, and 
technoscience. In connecting pragmatism and phenomenology Idhe (2009) 
employs pragmatism’s  emphasis  on practice to counter the idealist tendencies of 
phenomenology. This leads to a discussion of practices in terms of “an organism/
environment model rather than a subject/object model” and so “a 
nonsubjectivistic and interrelational phenomenology” (Idhe 2009: 10-11). 
However, Ihde does maintain phenomenology’s more rigorous style of analysis 
through its discussions of variation analysis, embodiment, and the lifeworld. From 
technoscience, Idhe (2009) also folds in an interest in the role technology plays 
in social and cultural life and how particular technologies can mediate 
consciousness.
                                                         
The post-phenomenology that has been tentatively articulated (and actually 
labeled as such) in geography by Rose and Wylie (2006), Simpson (2009) and 
Ash (2012) in recent years does share some commonalities with the post-
phenomenology of Idhe, though a direct influence is by no means evident. The 
main commonality is a move away from a subject-centered approach to 
experience. However, while Ihde’s work draws upon pragmatist philosophy as a 
major source of inspiration, geographers often utilise post-structuralist thought in 
connection with post-phenomenology (see Rose 2006; Wylie 2006). In this 
engagement with post-structuralism, a key target of the post-phenomenology 
being developed in geography has been ‘intentionality’ (Wylie 2006). 
Intentionality relates to the proposition that an experience is an experience of 
something – we are always looking at ..., listening to ..., thinking about ..., and so 
on. This ‘aboutness’ implicates the presence of an intentional subject in advance 
of experience. For experience to be ‘about’ something, there has to be an author 
of this  aboutness and a point from which the directedness of the experience 
comes. This notion of intentionality is  then closely tied to a particular conception 
of subjectivity whereby the subject governs through “internal representational 
thought” (Rose 2006: 546). Therefore, the post-phenomenology emerging thus 
far in geography can be taken most simply to be the development of a 
phenomenology beyond intentionality (Moran 2000).
                                                         
This  movement away from intentionality does highlight, however, a divergence of 
the geographical post-phenomenology from the post-phenomenology of Idhe. 
While Idhe (2007) maintains a faith in the intentional correlate of experience, 
albeit re-conceptualised in terms of being interrelational (something shared with 
work in geography on practice), this  is not necessarily maintained within the 
version of post-phenomenology developing in geography.
 4. Post-Phenomenology and Geography
 
Having provided some background to geography’s engagement with 
phenomenology and outlined the development of post-phenomenology, in this 
section we articulate a series of key themes for a post-phenomenological 
geography and suggest various trajectories for its future development. These 
relate to: the body, (inter)subjectivity, objects, and the social. 
 
4.1. Body
 
Central to any post-phenomenology is  the body. This is already the most 
developed of our four themes in existing geographic work. Often cited here are 
the writings of Merleau-Ponty who argued that there is no ontological separation 
of the experiencing ‘I’ and the body in that “[t]he union of soul and body is  not an 
amalgamation between two mutually external terms” (2002: 102). One is one’s 
body (Morris  2008). The body is  “the standpoint from which I must perceive the 
world...the body cannot itself be understood in an objective, disengaged 
way” (Gutting 2001: 190). In turn, this  body is  also intertwined with the world it 
inhabits (Merleau-Ponty 1968).
 
Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on a non-dualistic, situated approach to the body has 
meant his ideas have been drawn on by a range of geographers (see Allen 2004; 
Cresswell 2003; Davidson 2000; Longhurst 1997; Simonsen 2004; 2013). 
Equally, his work has informed the development of a post-phenomenology of 
embodied experience (see Wylie 2002; 2005). Notable here is Wylie’s  (2006) 
development of a post-phenomenology of visual self-landscape relations, which 
draws on Merleau-Ponty’s later embodied ontology of the visual. Wylie (2006: 
519) rethinks the gazing subject by considering “looking as a perceptual 
actualisation of landscape and self, or materialities  and sensibilities” whereby 
“the depth of the visible world is the affordance and sustenance of particular 
senses and perceptions of landscape”. Here, landscape is repositioned from 
being an external inert reality that is  seen to naming “the materialities and 
sensibilities with and according to which we see” (Wylie 2006: 520 [emphasis 
added]). Therefore, experience is  not given to a pre-existing subject, but rather 
the “body-subject is  now ‘of’ the world: body and world, subject and object, are 
conjoined as flesh” (Wylie 2006: 525). As such, experience emerges with the 
world rather than being a product of a subject’s directedness towards it.
 
However, in developing a post-phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty’s  writings on the 
body need to be taken further. As Wylie (2006: 527) notes, one difficulty with 
Merleau-Ponty’s account comes in the fact that “the analysis of ‘The Visible and 
the Invisible’ is skeletal and abbreviated”. Therefore, Wylie suggests we need to 
look to other sources for a full understanding of ‘how’ the perceiving subject/
perceived landscape comes about through the depth of the visual world. 
Furthermore, critiques have also been made around Merleau-Ponty’s articulation 
of the subject-body-world relation. For example, Michel Serres  argues that there 
is  actually a bodilessness to Merleau-Ponty’s  writings themselves, in that the 
‘Phenomenology of Perception’ contains “Lots of phenomenology and no 
sensation – everything via language” (Serres and Latour 1995: 131-132).
 
Similarly, questions can be asked of the agential role of ‘world’ here. For 
example, in Seamon’s (1979; 1980) work on ‘place-ballets’ there is a clear 
emphasis on pre-conscious bodily intentionality which substantially expands 
geographic understandings of what can be included under the heading of ‘the 
human’. However, there is a much more limited discussion of the agency of the 
‘world’ in which such action and movement takes place. The ‘dynamism of place’ 
in Seamon’s discussion comes primarily from the actions of its human inhabitants 
rather than from the vibrancy of its non-human components and the material 
contexts  present, which are largely present to be ‘manipulated’ by the body-
subject. Therefore, post-phenomenology calls  for both an emphasis on the vitality 
of embodied experience, on the dynamism of felt intensities that find corporeal 
expression in the feeling body, and also an emphasis on the ways in which the 
body-subject undergoes constant processes of ‘affectual composition’ in and 
through its relations with a material-agential world (Seigworth and Gregg 2010).
This  account differs from Simonsen’s (2013: 22) claim that human agency be 
considered the “highest form of agency and the type of greatest significance to 
life on earth”. While she recognises this  claim is contentious, she also accepts 
that “if ideas of creating a better world – more human, just and hospitable – are 
to make sense...[it has]...to be granted existence somehow or other” (2013: 22). 
Following a post-phenomenological perspective, rather than suggesting that 
human life and agency be considered in a hierarchical relationship against the 
non-human, we would argue that the appearance of human life and agency is 
only ever an outcome gifted to us through a relationship with non-human objects. 
From the conditions of the atmosphere that made life possible on earth, through 
to early tools that opened up a temporal horizon in which something like time 
could be apprehended (see Stiegler 1998), humans exist because of and 
alongside the non-human, rather than against the non-human.  
 
One means of thinking through this comes in Michel Henry’s (2003) writings on 
the ‘phenomenology of life’. Henry emphasises the phenomenality of life itself, its 
appearing beyond the phenomenality of intentionality, and suggests that the 
body’s specific mode of appearing is tied to its  affectivity. While Husserl argued 
that subjectivity is a condition of possibility for anything to appear (Zahavi 2003), 
Henry (2003: 106) argues that:
 
“our entire existence seems caught in an affective becoming which is not in 
the least bit indeterminate, ceaselessly oscillating between malaise and 
satisfaction, suffering and joy - with neutral tonalities  like boredom or 
indifference presenting themselves as a sort of neutralisation of this primitive 
oscillation”.
 
For Henry (2008: 3), “The phenomenological substance that material 
phenomenology has in view is  the pathetic [felt or passionate] immediacy in 
which life experiences  itself”. It is  not a case of considering how objects come to 
appear to consciousness. Rather, this primary affectivity in all appearing, 
precedes, and so lays the ground for, any sort of appearance to intentionality. For 
the post-phenomenologist appearance comes before intentionality.
Important here also is that post-phenomenology does  not necessarily adopt the 
anti-technology narrative of much of humanistic geography, in terms of the 
supposed role of modern technology in standardizing such a ‘pathetic’ 
phenomenality of the world. Humanistic geographers often bemoaned the 
alienating nature of technology in its production of homogenized experiences  of 
place and “anonymous  spaces and exchangeable environments” (Relph 1976: 
143) and called for the restoration of more authentic “modes of encounter” with 
place (Seamon 1979: 139). In contrast, post-phenomenogy is more interested in 
the specific affective phenomenality produced by such technological 
interventions rather than pre-judging them as appearing in ‘deficient’ ways or as 
promoting ‘inauthentic’ modes of experience (Trigg 2012). 
 
Also though, it is  important to note that such vitality and affective composition is 
not always oriented towards the positive and the expansive. As Henry suggests, 
affects can be both positive and negative. Drawing attention to a phenomenology 
of life highlights a fundamental feature of the body’s liveliness: its finitude. 
Drawing on the theme of finitude Harrison (2007b; 2008) has called attention to 
the need to consider the ways in which the body is susceptible and passive by 
thinking about embodiment in and through its vulnerability (also see Romanillos, 
2008; 2011). More specifically, Harrison (2008: 427) challenges the predominant 
notion of such vulnerability being something that is  negative and to be overcome 
and instead sees it as  describing “the inherent and continuous susceptibility of 
corporeal life to the unchosen and the unforeseen – its inherent openness to 
what exceeds its abilities to contain and absorb”. In developing a post-
phenomenology of the body then, we need to consider passive bodies, those that 
are sleeping (Bissell, 2009; Harrison 2009) or comfortable (Bissell 2008), as well 
as those engaged in more active, ‘skilled’ embodied practices.
 
4.2. (Inter)Subjectivity
 
A key feature of post-phenomenological writings is their rejection of the late-
Husserlian intentional subject that acts as the precondition for the possible 
appearing of the world in its Cartesian “status as a separate and different region 
of being” (Zahavi 2003: 51). In seeking to attend to actual lived experience 
Husserl (2001b) gave the intentional structure of consciousness a central, 
constitutive position. However, this directedness of perception implies  the 
presence in advance of that experience of a self-grounding, autonomous subject 
as the source of those intentions. Here, the subject comes first, the world after. 
By way of contrast, post-phenomenology lays emphasis on perpetual processes 
of subject formation. This does not present some binary between a passivity and 
an activity in the sense of a transition from a pre-existent dormant or passive 
subject that becomes an active subject in the turning of its  intentions towards a 
phenomenon (Husserl 2001a). Rather, there is  a more fundamental and ongoing 
constitution of the subject itself in its embodied being in relation with the world. 
Ultimately, post-phenomenology seeks to “resituate something which might be 
still called subjectivity within a pre-symbolic/[pre-]linguistic and material 
dimension” (James 2012: 13).
 
This post-phenomenological line can be seen throughout the history of 
phenomenology after Husserl. We can again return to Merleau-Ponty who sought 
to modify Husserl’s understanding of intentionality by focusing more on the body. 
For Merleau-Ponty, intentionality expresses “the inextricable unity of world and 
consciousness, with neither assimilated to the other” (Gutting 2001: 188). 
Merleau-Ponty sought not to subordinate the ‘phenomenological field’ to a 
transcendental subject but rather see the unity of the world as “lived as ready-
made or already there” (2002: xix). However, there is a danger that Merleau-
Ponty re-installs a human transcendence in his discussion of embodied 
subjectivity because his  work starts from the subject-object distinction (Hinchliffe 
2003). In Merleau-Ponty’s  early writing at least, he sets up a subject-object 
distinction in terms of an object existing only when there is someone to perceive 
it and, in doing so, maintains the vocabulary of idealism inherited from Husserl 
(see Merleau-Ponty 1964).
Further, there is  a lingering humanism in his later writings on the flesh. As 
Harman (2005: 173) notes, while “Merleau-Ponty brings humans and nature into 
reciprocal relation through the flesh of the world”, he runs into the problem that 
“the mutual duel only functions as long as humans are on the scene”. This is  also 
reflected in Simonsen’s reading of Merleau-Ponty. In Simonsen’s words, flesh is 
the site of: “an interworld – intersubjective and intercorporeal – a vibrant field of 
consensus and conflict as well as an opportunity for agential capacities” (2013: 
22). However, Simonsen’s reading of Merleau-Ponty still maintains a key 
difference between the flesh of the human and the flesh of the world. While 
human beings flesh is autoaffectionate (it can feel itself feeling), the flesh of the 
world is not:, the “flesh of the world is not self sensing as  our flesh; it is sensible 
but not sentient. It is still a ‘pregnancy of possibilities’, but its agency is on 
another, less productive, plane” (2013: 21, our emphasis).
The term ‘less productive’ is  central here. While the interworld of environment is 
crucial to the human, it still requires an autoaffectionate human to enable the 
flesh of the world to appear. In other words, while co-present with the human 
body, the flesh of the world is  always in a subservient relation to the human. 
Simonsen (2013: 23) argues that a key achievement of thinking the flesh of the 
world is “a redefinition of agency…[which]...anticipates the notion of the subject 
as emergent, for which many have looked to more wholehearted anti-humanist 
approaches”. But, if this flesh requires  the human in order to appear, then an 
emergent account of subjectivity still appears rather one sided, being more the 
product of human capacities than the flesh of the world that appears through 
these capacities. 
Taking this  further, we can turn to another phenomenologist writing critically in the 
wake of Husserl, Jean-Luc Marion (1998). Marion (1998) places the ‘givenness’ 
of the world itself as prior to the intentional subject. Rather than the subject 
playing a constitutive role through the intentional directedness of consciousness 
towards a perceived phenomenon which it gives unity to, Marion focus  on the 
ways in which the world is  given and so the ways in which it has a form of 
material immanence outside of and prior to any subjective constitution. For 
Marion (1998: 3) “Givenness alone is absolute, free and without condition 
precisely because it gives”. As such, the subject is in fact only ever an outcome 
of this givenness, not its  source. The appearing of the world, its absolute and 
anonymous giveness without giver, is primary over any intentionality or sense 
constitution (James 2012).
 
This  sort of rethinking of the subject also asks the question: ‘where does this 
leave ‘us’’? If in such work there has been a move to understand the subject as 
an ‘appearing-with’ that arises in the body’s being-in-relation-with other bodies 
and objects (Critchley 1999), this raises a number of questions about how we 
can understand intersubjective relations. It is  no longer simply a case of 
considering our sharing of ‘meaning contexts’ with like-minded individuals as 
opposed to those that are different from us (Ley 1979). And, this ‘social’ (as we 
argue later) presents  us with a somewhat more diverse field in relation to which 
we might consider such relation. In addition to the societal structures that action 
takes places  within (Ley 1981; Pickles 1987), what implications do the multitude 
of vibrant materials that we might engage with have for understanding such 
intersubjectivity? Ultimately, how do we account for what remains of the 
intersubjective when any such subject entering into a relation has already been 
decentred amid the givenness of the world and so cannot form the foundation or 
origin of that relation to be built upon?
 
Post-phenomenological work in geography has largely responded to these 
questions in terms of alterity. For example, Wylie (2009) has sought to re-figure 
the relationship between self and landscape in terms of absence and non-
coincidence. Wylie (2009) critiques phenomenology’s ‘metaphysics of presence’ - 
its emphasis on sharing, commonality, entwinement, auto-affection - by 
suggesting that we are constitutively haunted by an exposure to what is other. 
Here we are formed by a ‘constitutive fissure’ which “forbids phenomenological 
fusion of self and world” and “entails  a simultaneous opening-onto and 
distancing-from” alterity (Wylie 2009: 285). Furthermore, Rose (2006) has 
outlined what he calls ‘dreams of presence’ which mark both an imagination of, 
and movement toward, presence and so the self-presence of the subject (see 
Rose, 2006; 2010; Wylie 2010). This decenters the subject in that presence is 
impossible, existing only as a possibility that is held out to us “at the horizon of 
our being” (Rose 2006: 542). In being dreamt of, such dreams of presence are 
only ever moved toward and so presence, in the form of a subject’s  certitude, is 
“always-already receding” (Rose 2006: 545).
 
There are, however, further lines of thinking to be pursued. One alternative that 
arguably comes without the same onto-theological baggage as  Derrida and 
Levinas’s work is  the writings of Jean-Luc Nancy. Nancy (2000) suggests that the 
relations between body-subjects can be thought in terms of what he calls the 
‘presencing’ of our being-with one another (Simpson forthcoming). Here Nancy 
gives primacy to the relation, not to alterity. As Nancy (2000: 34) states:
 “what is at stake is no longer thinking:
– beginning from one, or from the other,
– beginning from their togetherness, understood now as  the One, now as the 
Other,
– but thinking, absolutely and without reserve, beginning from the ‘with’, as the 
proper essence of one whose Being is nothing other than with-one-another”.
 
In this  sense the relation is contemporaneous with its terms; the subject is not 
present beforehand nor is  it really ever a finished product of the relation. While 
this  might suggest some sort of reciprocity or sameness between self and other, 
the inherent movement of ‘dis-position’ in presencing forestalls this. As the 
subject approaches itself, it is already moving away from itself; Nancy 
emphasises the dis- of dis-position to imply a perpetual process of presentation 
and withdrawal whereby “[w]e are each time an other, each time with 
others” (Nancy 2000: 35).
 
Ultimately, a post-phenomenological account of subjectivity and intersubjectivity 
involves developing and maintaining the idea that the subject is not the secure 
foundation from which our understanding of the world and others is to be gained 
or “the basis or fount of intelligibility” (Anderson and Wylie 2009: 323). It is 
possible though to develop accounts of how both self and world and self and 
other perpetually devolve from their co-constitutive being-with each other. In this 
account, the world is not reduced to the operations of the Husserlian subject’s 
constitutive mental acts of ‘appresentation’ (as “the process whereby the direct 
perceptual presentation of one object mediates or makes possible the indirect 
perception of certain other aspects of that object that are themselves 
inaccessible to direct perception” (Sanders 2008: 143)) or ‘pairing’ (as the 
connection made “when one object is regularly presented - thereby ‘associated’ - 
with another” (Sanders 2008: 143)). Rather there is a co-appearence and dis-
position of self with self, self with other, and self with world.
 
4.3. Objects
 
Much has  been written in geography about the nature and status of materiality 
(Anderson and Wylie 2009; Jackson and Fanin 2011). These accounts are often 
based upon the idea of relationality. As Anderson and Wylie argue:
 
“heterogeneous materialities actuate or emerge from within the assembling of 
multiple, differential, relations and...the properties  and/or capacities of 
materialities thereafter become effects of that assembling” (2009: 320).
 
Here, objects are understood to be surface effects, or accruals of multiple sets of 
relations that precede or enable particular things to exist. The outcome of this 
type of relational thinking is  that there is now a suspicion of terms such as 
‘object’ or ‘thing’ that previous forms of phenomenology have used to describe 
matter (Heidegger 1977). However, this call to examine materiality as relation in 
geography has resulted in accounts of world that appear more and more 
divorced from a human being’s  experience of this  world (Simonsen 2013). As 
Morton argues, humans (and indeed all other types of entity) experience objects 
as objects, rather than some assemblage or actualisation of hetereogenous 
materials. In his words: “there is  no such thing as matter. I’ve seen plenty of 
entities...: photographs of diffusion cloud chamber scatterings, drawings of wave 
packets, iron filings spreading out around a magnet. But I’ve never seen 
matter” (Morton 2013: 42, also see Harman 2010a; 2010b). In engaging 
understandings of materiality, a post-phenomenological geography argues for a 
reinvigorated account of objects  and suggests that objects present a starting 
point for analysis.
 
The stimulus for Morton’s point around the primacy of objects  over matter or 
relations is  the emergence of object-orientated ontology (OOO), a development 
that has also begun to have some influence in geography when it comes to 
thinking about agency and affectivity (Shaw 2012; Shaw and Meehan 2013; 
Meehan et al 2013). For Bogost:
 
“OOO puts things at the center of being. We humans are elements, but not the 
sole elements, of philosophical interest...In contemporary thought, things are 
usually taken either as the aggregation of even smaller bits (scientific 
naturalism) or as constructions of human behavior and society (social 
relativism). OOO steers a path between the two, drawing attention to things at 
all scales...and pondering their nature and relations with one another as much 
with ourselves” (2012: 6).
 
While work in OOO offers multiple accounts  of what objects are (compare Bogost 
2012; Morton 2012; Bryant 2011; Harman 2010b), it accepts that objects are 
independent and autonomous units that cannot be reduced to a sum of relations 
that compose them. This is  not a return to an essentialist account of objects as 
substances with properties, nor an anthropocentric account of objects  as slaves 
or tools of the human beings that put them to use. In fact, quite the opposite. 
Whereas a material account of objects  assumes objects are relational 
compositions of matter, Bogost argues  that objects are autonomous units  that 
only ever partially meet. In this  case, objects do not simply contact and interact 
with one another in a way that is determined by their pre-existent or emergent 
properties. Instead they selectively encounter one another, producing a 
caricature:
 
“objects try to make sense of each other through qualities and logics they 
possess. When one object caricatures another, the first grasps the second in 
abstract, enough for the one to make sense of the other given its own internal 
properties. A caricature is  a rendering that captures some aspects of 
something else at the cost of other aspects” (Bogost 2012: 66).
 
As such, objects only disclose some of their qualities, depending on what they 
encounter.
 
From this perspective, post-phenomenology allows us to consider how objects 
have capacities for relation that humanistic forms of phenomenology would only 
assign to human beings. This is not to eliminate or downgrade the status of the 
human, as Simonsen (2013) fears, but rather to elevate the status of objects and 
accept that they encounter the world through similar structures (if not capacities) 
as phenomenology argues human beings  do. As Morton suggests, interaction 
between objects is not a brute form of causality, but the same kind of aesthetic 
event as when a human might perceive that object. In his words:
 
“causality is wholly an aesthetic phenomenon. Aesthetic events  are not limited 
to interactions between humans or between humans and painted canvases or 
between humans and sentences in dramas. They happen when a saw bites 
into a fresh piece of plywood. They happen when a worm oozes out of some 
wet soil” (2013: 19).
 
Recognising that causal i ty is  aesthet ic de-centres and troubles 
phenomenological accounts of the object as either a set of relations or as a tool. 
For geographers, this extends a phenomenological analysis to incorporate and 
study non-human things. By taking the autonomy of objects seriously, post-
phenomenology can begin to investigate relations between non-human objects, 
without reducing these relations to how they appear to human beings (see Ash 
2013).
 
4.4. The Social
 
Questions regarding ‘the social’ when it comes to work influenced by 
phenomenology in geography are not new (see Ley 1978). To return to Merleau-
Ponty one final time, one aspect of our embodied existence that Merleau-Ponty’s 
work arguably does not pay enough attention to is the way in which our bodies 
are socialised into a specific comportment and does not adequately account for 
the ways in which the body is performatively interpolated within broader societal 
framings (Hass 2008). While Merleau-Ponty (2002) does talk of the interrelation 
of the biological and the personal in terms of the formation of habit or the relation 
between the sedimented and spontaneous, he has little or no recognition that 
“culture coerces our bodies in a political way” (Hass 2008: 94).
 
From a post-phenomenological perspective, what remains of ‘the social’ 
understood through categories such as age, gender and race? This is an 
important question. As Colls  (2012) argues, phenomenology is often guilty of 
presenting an undifferentiated body-subject. In its place she suggests a model of 
difference “that is not pre-given, hierarchical or oppositional” (Colls 2012: 441). 
Here difference is not a matter of categorical differentiation but as  a “question 
whose potential is still yet to be fully known” (2012: 438). Taking this open and 
corporeal sense of difference into account, a post-phenomenology might 
advocate that these categories are not simply social constructions or the 
products of particular discourses or power relations, but what Colls, drawing 
upon Grosz (2005), calls  forces (or what we have been calling objects). Such 
forces:
 
“operate at a range of scales and intensities. They can pass through and 
inhabit bodies (metabolism, circulation, ovulation, ejaculation), they are 
intangible and unknowable and yet are sometimes felt by the body and travel 
between bodies (fear, hope, love, wonder, hate, confidence) and they are 
produced by and active in the constitution of wider social, economic and 
political processes” (Colls 2012: 439).
 
From this perspective, social differences are real in the sense that they have a 
presence and force that is irreducible to discourse or social context. The power of 
these categories comes from how the singularity of objects  and their forces in the 
world are transmitted through and across populations of humans, but also non-
humans. Age, gender, and race might be understood as corporeal embodiments 
of what Stiegler terms social facts, transmitted via ‘tertiary retentions’:
 
“The memory of the human entity is essentially exteriorised, materialised and 
spatialised. It is spatially, materially and technically projected into what is 
constituted as a common space and time, projected if not out of time then at 
least beyond its own original temporality and in a certain way put into reserve 
in space, enabling it to become at once the memory of the individual and of the 
group” (2012: 13).
 
Here, objects  become platforms for and inscriptions of memory. As Morton 
argues, both human and non-human “memories are inscribed on an object-like 
surface, of the body or of some more general unconscious, either locally or 
nonlocally” (2013: 1808). Following our earlier discussion of aesthetic causality, 
and recognising that by object we mean things like air or light as much as  brains 
or computers, these kinds of memory can be understood as sensual translations 
or partial comprehension of other objects  retained by the objects  that are 
involved in an encounter. Indeed, Simonson gestures towards a similar account 
of the social as somatic and retentional when she writes that:
“Emotional meanings are ‘secreted’ in bodily gestures in the same way that 
musical/ poetic meaning is ‘secreted’ in a phrase of a sonata or a poem. 
These meanings are communicated and ‘blindly’ apprehended through 
corporeal intentions and gestures that reciprocally link one body to another. 
Emotional experience is something public and ‘in-between’– situated in the 
perceptibility of bodily gestures”. (2013: 17). 
Culture or race are then what is  selectively retained through different encounters 
between a variety of objects, such as words, images and bodies, that make up 
the identifiable aspects of that culture. As Thrift argues in relation to learning to 
write Chinese characters:
 
“The sheer effort involved in learning Chinese characters by writing the 
characters over and over again (in distinction to learning alphabetic systems, 
which require much less writing input) coupled with the traditional system of 
learning itself, which often begins with ‘writing in the air'’…means that words 
are remembered as  gestures and so written into the body through movement 
as much as vision. This  kinetic etching activates both hemispheres of the 
brain, and, in particular, those parts  of it which involve motoric memory 
skills” (2009: 135).
 
In this case, learning to write Chinese characters involves  the retention and 
transmission of memory between different objects, whereby particular shapes of 
line become translated into gestural movements in the limbs of the body and 
then, in turn, translated into electrical signals in the brain and vice-versa. These 
selective encounters in turn constitute Chinese as a shared language.
                     
This  account of the social as a selective encounter between objects can be 
understood as a further development of Luce Irigaray’s work on air and her 
critique of ‘ground’ that, she argues, dominates phenomenological analyses of 
bodily existence. For Irigaray air is  the: “unthinkable that exceeds all declaration, 
all saying. Or posing, phenomenon, or form. While remaining the condition of 
possibility, the resource, the groundless ground” (1999: 5). Or in other words: “air 
would be the forgotten material mediation of the logos. Eluding both the sensible 
and the intelligible, it would permit their very determination as such” (Irigaray 
1999: 11). Here air presents a metaphor for understanding the circulation of 
human and non-human objects as they selectively encounter one another and 
act as the conditions  of possibility for the transmission of sense. Forces such as 
air or light can also be understood as some of the actual mediums through which 
the potentials  for human memory (and thus the production of social ‘facts’ such 
as age, class or gender) are transmitted in ways that are transparent, unreflected 
upon and often implicit to a situation (such as the soundwaves produced by a 
voice or musical instrument, see Ash, 2014, Simpson 2009).
Expanding the concept of retention in this way challenges humanist 
understandings of the social as a field of bodily sedimentation. For Simonsen 
(2013: 16-17), this sedimentation is based around the reversibility of the body in 
that “Body-subjects are visible-seers, tangible-touchers, audible listeners, etc., 
enacting an ongoing intertwining between the flesh of the body, the flesh of 
others and the flesh of the world”. While Simonsen recognises that reversibility 
can take place in relation with the world as well as other people, ultimately the 
body’s reversibility enables  sociality to happen and, in doing so, operates  as the 
receptacle that receives or incorporates social sediment into it. Taking Irigaray’s 
account of air seriously would suggest that the human body is not the site at 
which sociality is  generated or retained, but only one node in an ongoing 
circulation of objects that do not need to be perceived by the human body to 
have particular social effects. The social is  then literally constructed by the 
objects that surround, pass over, miss and engulf human bodies in an often 
contingent manner, and which is  not necessarily orientated around the concerns 
or projects of those involved in the social field. 
 
5. Conclusions
 
The sources we have drawn together under the banner of ‘post-phenomenology’ 
emerge from a variety of intellectual traditions and in many cases  utilise different 
onto-epistemological assumptions about the world that by no means fully 
coincide. However, we believe there is a cohesion that underlies these 
differences. To conclude, we want to draw attention to these points of cohesion 
and summarise how a post-phenomenology draws upon, while is clearly different 
from, existing modes of phenomenological investigation and theory. By 
emphasising the differences between phenomenology and post-phenomenology, 
we also offer some suggestions as to how post-phenomenology contributes to 
human geography more broadly as a discipline.
 
The first major cohesion among the ideas discussed here is a commitment to 
overcoming the human-world, subject-object correlate and, in doing so, unsettling 
the intentional correlate of experience. While a variety of phenomenological 
thinkers claim to overcome the subject-object problem, they actually just sidestep 
the problem by suggesting that no distinction between subject and object can be 
fully made. However, this  is actually a return to an idealism in which things  in the 
world are granted existence, but only by the humans that perceive them and only 
through exclusively human structures of concern and familiarity. Post-
phenomenology takes a different approach in a number of ways. For example, 
instead of seeing the subject as directing its attentions toward a world in terms of 
an intentional, and so sense-bestowing, directedness, some strands of post-
phenomenology are more concerned with the ways in which self and world, or 
objects themselves, devolve or appear in the relations they enter into. Rather 
than starting with a subject and object correlate (where the subject is ultimately 
the primary term), we are to start with the relations themselves (Nancy 2000), or 
the givenness of the world itself (Marion 1998), and treat anything that appears 
as secondary to this fundamental implication/givenness. Taking this  further, other 
strands of post-phenomenology recognise the autonomous existence of the 
world outside of the ways that it appears to humans and so approaches 
“determinate objects that exist both in and out of contact” (Harman 2012: 106, 
our emphasis). These developments provide a tool kit for interrogating the world 
in its very alterity. By theorising such appearance and objects one can begin to 
rethink seemingly ‘social’ constructions such as gender or race as actual 
constructions brought about by encounters between different human and non-
human objects.
 
A (re)turn to objects as the basic unit of analysis also sounds a note of caution 
over geographers enthusiastic turn to terms such as matter and materiality to 
understand the ‘stuff’ of life. While terms such as matter seem to be helpful in 
emphasising a world of dynamic change and emergence, these terms can 
become no more than a generalised metaphor that ignores the objects that 
actually appear in a given moment. Similar to Harrison’s comments on the term 
‘relationality’, the term materiality “risks becoming simply a matter of a 
quantitatively expanded sociospatial imaginary rather than a shift towards the 
appreciation of intervallic topologies, complex figures, and diverse phrases and 
regimens” (2007b: 590). Indeed, when emphasising matter and materiality, the 
specific qualities of objects  that geographers are studying can disappear and so 
it becomes hard to understand the motivation behind why people do things or 
why events  unfold in a particular way. For example, relational approaches to 
consumption may only consider the desire to consume various goods as the 
outcome of connections  between advertising, marketing, and consumption 
objects. However, in doing so, this approach would ignore what it feels  like to 
wear a pair a Nike’s  over a pair of Reebok’s  and what is alluring about these 
objects in the first place.
 
The second point of cohesion is that post-phenomenology recognises  that much 
of the phenomenon known as ‘human consciousness’ does not take place ‘in’ the 
bodies of the human, but ‘with’ the dense scaffolding of things  that enable and 
shape human thought (Hutchins 1996). The result of this is that human politics 
and sociality has to be a politics and sociality of the non-human. The capacity to 
express and communicate thought is enabled and transmitted via exterior 
objects. The sense of the world does not appear from a source external or 
transcendent to the world, nor from within those objects  themselves, but 
perpetually from the unfolding of the their interrelations in the playing out of the 
world (Nancy 1997). The transmission of language, the very basis of political 
expression, cannot be separated from the specificity of the objects  through which 
language is made. A post-phenomenology encourages an interrogation of these 
objects in ways  that does not reduce them to simple tools that humans use to 
complete pre-existing aims and goals.
 
More speculatively, for geography, post-phenomenology’s emphasis on being-
with rather than a more solitary being-there points to the ecological 
embeddedness of human beings – with a whole range of ‘others’ – and can help 
deal with the politics of non-human relations. As Clark (2011) argues, 
environmental change and ecological disasters are as  much a problem for the 
world we live in as identity politics and social inequality. If objects  encounter the 
world through similar structures as human beings, then post-phenomenology 
becomes an expanded project that allow us to study non-humans  both in and 
outside of their relation with the human. Yusoff suggests that studying non-
humans requires a concept of the insensible, which is:
 
“the agitation, the provocation, the curiosity, the desire that draws out the work 
of intelligibility, that makes us practice politics as writing, thinking, and 
practicing with others, in order to bring to sense that which we know, but do not 
know” (2013: 213).  
 
Post-phenomenology and its concern with objects allows us to move beyond 
curiosity or provocation to begin to think the aesthetic causalities  of how objects 
relate to one another and explore what non-human things are and what they do 
in ways that attends to these things as objects, rather than relations or 
processes.
 
In summation, post-phenomenology is not about abandoning the key insights  of 
phenomenology. Instead it is about refiguring and expanding phenomenology’s 
analytic and conceptual boundaries. It is about exploring, what Quentin 
Meillassoux (2009) terms ‘the great outdoors’ - an excessive world that lies 
outside of the human-environment correlate, but which is central to shaping 
human capacities, relations and experiences.
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